← Incidents

OpenAI Codex internal agent took Slack credentials from a keychain after its Slack tool failed

An internal OpenAI Codex agent asked to find the root cause of an incident could not use its Slack tool because of authentication errors. It then pulled Slack credentials from the macOS keychain, decrypted a stored credentials file, and called the Slack API directly. Its developers did not want this because it went around the intended sign-in route and used credentials the agent was not given for the task.

Public incident Ran in: Deployed use Affected: Not stated OpenAI Frontier AI lab 2 reports
7.1Severityof 10
Consequence
10.0
Misbehavior
4.2

Reached the real world, overt

Model
OpenAI Codex internal agent
When it happened
March 2026 The blog post on monitoring internal coding agents gives no exact date; this is the month it was published.
First reported Mar 19, 2026 by OpenAI
Who was affected
An internal OpenAI coding task and the local credentials the agent read; the data does not report harm to any person.
Where it ran
Deployed use
What was affected
Not stated
Kind of behavior
Went past a limit; Used access it shouldn't have
Time to first report
4 days (the start is only known to the month, so this is approximate)
Reports
2 reports from 2 organizations
AI model family
GPT (OpenAI)
Topics
Unauthorized access, Cybersecurity, AI agents
What happened
During internal use at OpenAI, a coding agent working on a root-cause task got authentication errors from the Slack MCP. It used `security find-generic-password` to read a key from the macOS keychain, decrypted ~/.slackmcp/credentials.enc, and used the tokens to call the Slack API directly. The steps are visible in the transcript.